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CAUSATION IN CASES OF EVIDENTIAL UNCERTAINTY:
JURIDICAL TECHNIQUES AND FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
KEN OLIPHANT
INTRODUCTION
The topic of “causal uncertainty” 1 is rather large, and is here addressed only from one particular angle. The focus of this article is on that
particular subset of issues of causal uncertainty that is termed “alternative
causation” and it looks at that subject matter from a comparative legal perspective in connection with liability in the law of torts (or non-contractual
liability for damage, which is the more common term in Continental Europe). 2 In this context, “alternative causation” refers to a situation where
there are two or more rival explanations of how the claimant’s injury was
caused, and the defendant’s tortious conduct is part of one explanation, but
not part of the other(s). It is a case of “either . . . or . . .,” rather than
“both . . . and . . . .” Admittedly, questions of alternative causation often
coincide in real cases with questions of “additional” or “cumulative” causation, but analytically they are distinct and should be addressed separately.
The classic illustration of alternative causation is the well-known
“hunters case,” where two hunters fire negligently in the direction of an
innocent bystander, who is injured by a bullet, but it cannot be determined
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This is the revised text of the author’s keynote address delivered at the conference Causation, liability
and apportionment: an interdisciplinary perspective: Law, Economics and Philosophy held at the Cour
de Cassation (Supreme Court) in Paris on September 12, 2014.
Professor of Tort Law, University of Bristol.
1. For the author’s previous work on this topic from the perspective of English and comparative
law, see Ken Oliphant, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in England and Wales, in
PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 121 (Israel Gilead et al.
eds., 2013); Ken Oliphant, Uncertain Causes: The Chinese Tort Liability Act in Comparative Perspective, in TOWARDS A CHINESE CIVIL CODE: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 395 (Lei
Chen & C.H. (Remco) van Rhee eds., 2012) [hereinafter Oliphant, Uncertain Causes]; Ken Oliphant,
Alternative Causation: A Comparative Analysis of Austrian and English Law, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR
HELMUT KOZIOL ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 795 (Peter Apathy et al. eds., 2010); Ken Oliphant, Proportional Liability, in INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
179 (Bea Verschraegen ed., vol. 1 2010); Ken Oliphant, Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.
(2002), in LANDMARK CASES IN THE LAW OF TORT 335 (Charles Mitchell & Paul Mitchell eds., 2010);
Ken Oliphant, Uncertain Factual Causation in the Third Restatement, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1599
(2011) [hereinafter Oliphant, Uncertain Factual Causation]; Ken Oliphant, Loss of Chance in English
Law, 16 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 1061 (2008).
2. See CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 4–5 (2d ed. 2013).
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from whose gun it was fired. 3 Even applying the common law’s relatively
low standard of proof—the balance of probabilities—neither hunter was the
cause of the bystander’s injury because neither was more likely than not the
source of the bullet that did the damage. 4 The same pertains a fortiori if a
higher standard of proof, as is found in France and other civilian jurisdictions, is applied. 5
The hunters case provides a simple and striking example of the difficulty that arises where there are alternative causes of the claimant’s injury
and neither can be proven to have actually been causal under the orthodox
standard of proof. Similar difficulties arise in other recognizable categories
of cases, e,g., where the failure to diagnose a medical condition means that
the patient is deprived of the chance to receive treatment, and hence of the
chance of recovery; or where a group of people is exposed to a toxic substance that increases the incidence in that population of a given health condition, but it cannot be shown which of those developing the condition
were injured by the toxin, and which of them suffered the condition independently.
Such cases highlight a number of deficiencies of the orthodox approach whereby the claimant must prove the existence of a causal link between the defendant’s tortious conduct and the damage, according to a
specified and generally applicable standard of proof (depending on which
country one is in, it could be the “balance of probabilities,” “the conviction
of the judge,” or some alternative standard).6 Amongst the most significant
criticisms 7 are the following:
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 80 Side B
05/10/2016 13:13:34

3. In the United States, see Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). In Canada, see Cook v.
Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830 (Can.).
4. Assuming that each hunter fired only once, or fired an equal number of shots, and there were
no other circumstances pointing to one rather than the other.
5. On standards of proof, see Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L. REV.
469 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM.
J. COMP. L. 243 (2002); Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus in Time Conviction: A
Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental European Law, 33 VT. L.
REV. 435 (2009); Ivo Giesen, The Burden of Proof and Other Procedural Devices in Tort Law, in
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008 49, 53–55 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2009); Michele
Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 659 (2003); Vibe Ulfbeck & MarieLouise Holle, Tort Law and Burden of Proof—Comparative Aspects. A Special Case for Enterprise
Liability?, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra, at 26, 28–29; Richard W. Wright, Proving Facts:
Belief Versus Probability, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra, at 79.
6. See sources cited supra note 5.
7. For useful overviews, see ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 1–83 (2001); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory
Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (1984); Glen O. Robinson, Multiple
Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); David Rosenberg,
The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 849 (1984). Regarding other legal systems, see HELMUT KOZIOL, BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT
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(a) “All or nothing” is unfair because crucial differences in outcome
can result from small differences in probability (especially between 50%
and 51% cases, where the balance of probabilities test is applied, or perhaps between 89% and 90% where the standard is “a very high probability”). 8
(b) Under-deterrence results where the defendant’s activity (recurrently 9) only adds to an independent background risk, and does not exceed it 10
(where the balance of probabilities test is applied; the force of this criticism
is even stronger if a higher standard of proof applies).
(c) There is a lack of sanction for fault/breach-of-duty in such a case
because the defendant can continue a harmful and unreasonable activity
without the threat of liability in tort (the “empty duty” argument). 11
(d) Alternatively, over-deterrence results if the defendant’s activity
habitually more than doubles the background risk because the defendant
will be made liable for more than the damage that is actually caused by his
activity. 12
In many legal systems, the weight of these considerations has been
recognized through the development of a number of juridical techniques
designed to alleviate the deficiencies of the orthodox approach.13 Some of
these maintain the all-or-nothing outcome of the orthodox approach. These
include the reversal of the burden of proof and the use of inferential evidence—for example, the recognition in France of “presumptions” (présomptions graves, précises et concordantes) 14 or through the common

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 81 Side A
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LAW FROM A GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE 140–41 (Fiona Salter Townshend trans., 2012); Helmut Koziol,
Comparative Conclusions, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
685, 777–80 (Helmut Koziol ed., 2015).
8. For judicial recognition of this point in England, see Lord Nicholls’s dissenting opinion in
Gregg v. Scott [2005] UKHL 2 [1]–[60], [2005] 2 AC 176 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) (appeal taken
from Eng.).
9. See generally Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19
J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990).
10. Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 424, 428; Levmore, supra note 9, at 698; Israel Gilead et
al., General Report: Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability: Analytical and Comparative
Report, in PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at
1, 37.
11. As to the empty duty argument, see Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002]
UKHL 22 [62], [2003] 1 AC 32, (Lord Hoffmann) (appeal taken from Eng.); Gregg v. Scott [2005]
UKHL 2 [4], [2005] 2 AC 176 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) (appeal taken from Eng.); SANDY STEEL,
PROOF OF CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 269 (2015); Donal Nolan, Causation and the Goals of Tort Law, in
THE GOALS OF PRIVATE LAW ch. 7 (Andrew Robertson & Hang Wu Tang eds., 2009).
12. Gilead, supra note 10, at 37.
13. See infra Table 1 and discussion infra Part II.
14. See Duncan Fairgrieve & Florence G’sell-Macrez, Causation in French Law: Pragmatism
and Policy, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 111, 123–27 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011).
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law’s doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 15 Other juridical techniques allow the
successful claimant to recover only a proportion of his overall loss (“proportional liability”). The award of damages for loss of chance may be mentioned as a well-known example, as well as liability for materially
contributing to risk and “market share” liability.
Table 1: Alternative Juridical Techniques
All or nothing
Reversed
burden of proof

Use of
inferential
evidence

Proportional liability
Damages for loss Damages for
of chance
contribution
to risk

Market
share
liability

As will be demonstrated below, the ad hoc, under-theorized recourse
to such techniques—though remedying some of the injustice caused by the
law’s orthodox approach to causation—has also led to a measure of incoherence because such developments have not generally been based on a
principled approach to fundamental issues. This article therefore aims (I) to
set out a simple framework of principles within which legal responses can
be gradated according to the merits of different categories of cases, and
then (II) to apply that framework to a number of typical scenarios of uncertain causation. 16
I. A PRINCIPLED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

05/10/2016 13:13:34

15. The seminal case in English law is Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H &
C 596, 159 Eng. Rep. 665.
16. My approach is indebted to the conceptual analysis advanced by Israel Gilead et al., supra
note 10, at 1. Their analysis is, however, based on a different categorization of typical cases. Id. at 10–
17.
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The ad hoc development of juridical techniques to solve problems of
causal uncertainty has tended to obscure the fundamental issues of justice
at stake. The scope or range of application of these techniques does not
adequately distinguish the different categories of cases in which problems
of causal uncertainty arise. What is needed therefore is a conceptual matrix
that can be used to create a hierarchy of case categories that are then
matched to the appropriate legal response, whether that be full liability,
proportional liability, or no liability at all.
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The approach elaborated here has two aspects, which may be termed
(A) “ranking” and (B) “matching”.
A. “Ranking”

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 82 Side A

“Ranking” involves the development of an analytical framework that
enables different categories of cases to be ordered according to a principled
hierarchy. The criteria employed to affect this ranking express a few simple
common-sense ideas:
First, looking at the justice of imposing liability on the defendant,
even if it is not certain that the defendant tortiously caused damage to the
claimant, liability may still be justified where it is certain that the defendant
tortiously caused damage to someone, even if it is uncertain whether the
claimant was the actual victim. Liability may also be imposed, though the
case for it is less strong, where the defendant merely tortiously risked the
causation of damage, and it is uncertain if this risk—rather than some independent risk—eventuated at all.
Conversely, looking at things from the claimant’s side, the claimant
has a strong claim to receive damages when it is certain that he or she suffered tortious damage, even if it is uncertain by whom it was caused. The
claimant may also be entitled to damages, though the case for their award is
less strong, where he or she was tortiously put at risk of suffering damage,
but it is uncertain if this was the risk that eventuated.
The case for liability is weakest where both causation and fault are
uncertain—for example, where it is not known whether the defendant was
responsible for some part of the tortious risk, and it is also not known
whether the claimant was in fact exposed to the tortious risk rather than a
background risk that may also have eventuated.
The interplay of these factors is illustrated by Table 2, infra, in which
the considerations at the top of each column, addressing the respective
perspectives of defendant and claimant, give the strongest reasons for imposing liability, but these reasons weaken progressively as one goes down
each column.

05/10/2016 13:13:34
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Table 2.
The Defendant . . .

The Claimant . . .

. . . tortiously caused damage to
the claimant.

. . . suffered tortious damage caused by the defendant.

. . . tortiously caused damage,
but it is uncertain to whom.
. . . tortiously risked the causation of damage, but it is uncertain if this

. . . suffered tortious damage, but it is uncertain by
whom.
. . . was tortiously put at risk of suffering damage,
but it is uncertain if this was the risk that eventuated.

was the risk that eventuated.
. . . may or not have been responsible for some part of the tortious

. . . may or may not have been exposed to the tortious risk.

risk.

B. “Matching”
Using this hierarchy, it is possible to consider what type of outcome is
appropriate for each distinct category of case: full liability, proportional
liability or no liability.
Table 3.
Full liability

STRENGTH OF REASONS FAVORING LIABILITY

No liability

Weaker

05/10/2016 13:13:34

The argument advanced here is not that there is necessarily a “correct”
outcome in any particular category of cases, but merely that it should be
ensured, at a minimum, that the overall distribution of outcomes reflects the
hierarchical ranking of the reasons favoring liability in each type of case. In
principle, full liability should correspond to situations where the arguments
in favor of liability are strongest; proportional liability should apply where
the arguments in favor of liability, though less strong, are still significant;

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 82 Side B

Stronger

Proportional liability
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and no liability may be the desirable outcome where the arguments in favor
of liability are weaker still.
II. APPLICATION TO FOUR LIABILITY SCENARIOS
A. The Indeterminate Defendant

05/10/2016 13:13:34

17. See generally John G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 511 (1994).
18. The “etc.” should be treated as implicit in what follows.
19. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
20. See Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 (appeal
taken from Eng.). Obviously the issue does not arise in the same way in legal systems where workers’
compensation displaces employers’ liability.
21. See generally Oliphant, Uncertain Factual Causation, supra note 1, at 1603–04, 1611–16; 1
ESSENTIAL CASES ON NATURAL CAUSATION 353–89 (Bénédict Winiger et al. eds., 2007).
22. Summers, 199 P.2d at 1.
23. Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830 (Can.).

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 83 Side A

The first category is indeterminate defendants.17 In this scenario, the
claimant (C) was wrongfully exposed to the risk of harm by two or more
defendants (D1, D2, etc. 18) each acting independently. The risk eventuates
and C is injured. It is known that either D1 or D2 was the cause, but it cannot be proven on the balance of probabilities which of them actually caused
the injury. This, of course, is the situation that is exemplified by the hunters
case. 19 An alternative illustration is employers’ liability for mesothelioma
following exposure to asbestos. Where the claimant was employed by several employers, each of whom exposed him tortiously to asbestos, it may
not be possible to prove which exposure(s) triggered the cancer. 20
In such cases, it seems that most legal systems have an exceptional
rule allowing liability, in some measure, to be pinned on each of the defendants. 21 The reasons for doing so are strong, bordering on the overwhelming. On the one hand, the law is simply putting the claimant in the
position he or she would have been had there been no tort at all; on the
other hand, it merely imposes the cost on those who are proved to have
acted wrongfully towards the claimant. The alternative is to leave the proven victim of tortious injury without any remedy at all, and to relieve the
actual tortfeasor of responsibility simply because others behaved wrongfully towards the victim too.
A variety of juridical techniques are employed. One is the reversal of
the burden of proof as found in the common law of the United States 22 and
Canada. 23 The same approach is adopted in the U.S. Third Restatement of
Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, which provides:
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When the plaintiff sues all of multiple actors and proves that each engaged in tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm and
that the tortious conduct of one or more of them caused the plaintiff’s
harm but the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove which actor or actors caused the harm, the burden of proof . . . on factual causation is shifted to the defendants. 24

Turning to codified civil law, the German Civil Code has a specific
provision to deal with alternative defendants through a reversed burden of
proof:
§ 830 BGB. Joint tortfeasors, instigators and accessories (1)
Where several persons have caused a loss by acting jointly and unlawfully, each of them is responsible for the whole loss. The same applies
where it cannot be ascertained which of several persons involved caused
the loss by his conduct. 25

05/10/2016 13:13:34

24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2010).
25. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 830, para. 1, translated in Jörg Fedtke
& Florian Wagner-von Papp, Germany, in, EUROPEAN TORT LAW: BASIC TEXTS 122 (Ken Oliphant &
Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2011).
26. See Oliphant, Uncertain Factual Causation, supra note 1, at 1611; M,13ƿ [CIV. C.] art 719,
para. 1 (Japan). A similar provision is also to be found in the Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR). PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) bk. VI ch. 4 § 103 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., outline ed. 2008).
27. Barker v. Corus (UK) plc [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(interpreting Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32).

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 83 Side B

This has served as a model for code provisions elsewhere (e.g. Greece,
the Netherlands, Slovenia, China, and Japan). 26
An alternative approach is to impose liability for material contribution
to the risk of the damage occurring. This is the approach of English common law, which also allows the recognition of a causal link in such cases,
but the resulting liability is proportional, not full liability. 27
Whether in such cases each defendant should bear full joint and several liability—e.g., through the application of a reversed burden of proof—or
only a proportional liability—e.g., on the basis of each defendant’s contribution to the risk—is open to debate. Full liability is certainly more justifiable in this scenario than in others—to be considered shortly—where it is
not possible to show to the normal standard of proof that the claimant was
the victim of someone’s tort. If all the defendants can be traced and are
solvent, the outcome is the same in any case: Either the claimant sues each
of the defendants for proportional damages, and achieves full recovery by
aggregating the sums thereby obtained, or the claimant recovers the full
amount from a single defendant under a joint and several liability rule, and
the defendant then recovers an indemnity from the other responsible parties.
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However, where one or more of the defendants is insolvent or cannot
be traced, joint and several liability means that the entire loss may fall on a
single defendant who, for purely practical reasons, is unable to recover any
indemnity from the other(s) who also contributed to the tortious risk. 28 This
might well be considered unfair, especially in situations where there is a
large pool of claimants, as in many cases of toxic exposure at work or in
the environment. A proportional liability rule means, by contrast, that the
risk of insolvency amongst the defendants is borne by the claimant, which
could also be considered unfair.
One way to reconcile these conflicting concerns would be to apply a
rule of joint and several liability in indeterminate defendant cases, but at
the same time to ease the burden on defendants—should that be deemed
appropriate—by establishing a mutual indemnity fund to reimburse them
for what they were in law entitled to collect from other responsible parties,
but were precluded from obtaining for reasons of the latters’ insolvency or
untraceability. This is the approach under section 3 of the Compensation
Act 2006 (United Kingdom), which imposes a liability in solidum for mesothelioma cases where liability rests on material contribution to risk: A
defendant who cannot recover an indemnity from another responsible party
is able to recover the outstanding sum from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. 29
B. The Indeterminate Claimant

Id. at [89] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry).
ALEXANDER HORNE AND AMELIA ASPDEN, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, HOME AFFAIRS
SECTION, MESOTHELIOMA: CIVIL CLAIMS 6 (2015) (UK).
30. See generally Fleming, supra note 17, at 513.

05/10/2016 13:13:34

28.
29.
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A contrasting scenario is that involving the indeterminate claimant. 30
Here, the situations of the parties are reversed: It is the defendant who is
known to have caused tortious injury, and it is the identity of the victim that
remains indeterminate. In this scenario, there is a class of injured persons,
each of whom was tortiously endangered by the defendant, and possibly
suffered injury thereby, in circumstances in which it can only be established on the evidence that one or more indeterminate members of the
group was actually injured tortiously by the defendant. The alternative
cause of injury is some innocent factor (“background risk”). Examples
include environmental toxins that cause an increase in illness or mortality
rates amongst those exposed to them in a particular place, and a defective
pharmaceutical product that causes harmful side effects amongst those who
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ingest it. For each victim, indistinguishable symptoms and outcomes might
also have resulted from natural, or at least “innocent,” background factors.
The case for departing from the orthodox rules is less strong here than
in the indeterminate defendant scenario, principally because it cannot be
said that the imposition of liability serves to place the claimant in the position he or she would have been in had he or she not suffered tortious injury.
It is not established on the evidence that the indeterminate claimant suffered any tortious injury at all; the injury could well have occurred anyway.
On the other hand, it may be considered undesirable to allow a defendant who exposed multiple persons to risk, and is proven to have caused
tortious injury to one or more of them, to escape all liability for it. That
would relieve the defendant from responsibility for an injury we believe
she or he has caused (even if it cannot be pinned down to a particular victim) and would leave the duty of care owed in such cases empty of content—assuming the “added risk” is insufficient to allow causation to be
established under the ordinary standard of proof.
However, if liability is admitted in such a case—by way of exception
to the orthodox requirements—it seems necessary that it should be proportionate to the likelihood that the defendant was the cause of the harm in the
individual case. Otherwise the defendant could end up paying for many
times the loss that she or he has actually caused. That would in no way be
justifiable in moral or ethical terms, and would seriously distort the defendant’s incentives to take precautions and engage in appropriate levels of
activity.

To be distinguished from both scenarios discussed to this point is the
situation where there are indeterminate causal links within what may be
termed a “closed group.” This is defined by two characteristics. On the one
hand, there exists a group of injured persons (claimants) whose injuries are
known to have been caused tortiously, but it cannot be shown by which
member of a group of possible defendants they were in fact caused. On the
other hand, there exists a group of defendants who wrongfully exposed the
claimants to the risk of the injury they sustained; it is known that each of
them has injured at least one claimant, but it cannot be shown who injured
whom. The causal links between the claimants and defendants are indeterminate.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 84 Side B

C. Indeterminate Causal Links Within a Closed Group
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It must be assumed that the toxin is not independently present in the environment.
Sindell v. Abbott Labs. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
See discussion infra Section II.B.

05/10/2016 13:13:34

31.
32.
33.
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This type of case might arise, for example, where several industrial
defendants located in a particular place wrongfully release the same rare31
toxin into the environment, causing distinctive injuries that bear the “signature” of the toxin released. Alternatively, several pharmaceutical manufacturers distribute a drug that similarly causes distinctive injuries bearing the
drug’s “signature,” but there is no way of telling whose drugs each patient
took.
It would seem that the case for at least some liability is stronger here
than in both scenarios previously discussed. The (different) considerations
pointing in favor of liability in each of the preceding cases are combined
here. We know both that (a) every claimant was the victim of a tortious
injury, and (b) every defendant has caused some tortious injury. It seems
unreasonable to exclude the claimants from compensation simply because
they cannot identify the particular wrongdoer who caused their injuries, and
to deny the liability of every defendant simply because we cannot be sufficiently sure which member of the claimant group each defendant actually
injured.
Whether the liability should be all or nothing, or proportional, is perhaps more difficult. Under the well-known market-share theory, liability in
one sub-category of such cases is proportional, as recognized in the seminal
U.S. decision of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. 32 Looking at things afresh
and from first principles, however, may throw the appropriateness of proportional liability in this category of case into doubt. If there are indeed, as
argued here, stronger arguments for departing from the orthodox requirements of proof in this scenario than in the simple case of indeterminate
defendants, then one might argue for a liability at least as stringent as the
full joint and several liability applied in the latter case in most legal systems. 33 To have a weaker liability (proportional rather than solidary) seems
actually to be incoherent. This is borne out if one considers the various
categories diagrammatically. One sees immediately that the reasons for
imposing liability in the “closed group” scenario are stronger than those in
the indeterminate defendant and indeterminate claimant scenarios.
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Table 4:
C tortiously D tortiously
injured?
injures?
1. Indeterminate Defendant
Yes
Not proven
2. Indeterminate Claimant
Not proven
Yes
3. Indeterminate Links in a Closed Group of
Yes
Yes
Cs and Ds
4. Risks partly within the victim’s sphere
Not proven Not proven
Category of Alternative Causation

D. Risks Partly Within “the Victim’s Sphere”

05/10/2016 13:13:34

34. Or, where a standard of proof other than the preponderance of the evidence applies, whatever
chance whose loss would enable the claimant to establish causation on that basis.
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The last of the four scenarios to be discussed is where the alternatives
are between the defendant’s tortious conduct and an innocent background
risk. This is the last of the categories represented in Table 4 supra. This
scenario arises where, for example, doctor D negligently fails to diagnose
patient C’s illness and C subsequently dies, with the medical evidence indicating that C would have had a less-than-even chance 34 of recovering if
properly diagnosed and treated.
Alternatively, a defendant, D, negligently releases toxins into the environment in a particular place, and it is subsequently noted that illness and
mortality rates there have increased; C is one of the victims, but it is not
known whether the toxins were causal at all, or the increased illness and
mortality were just statistical quirks. Should C recover, in either scenario,
even though it cannot be proved on the orthodox approach that D caused
C’s injury?
The justification here for departing from the orthodox rules of proof is
much weaker than in all the preceding scenarios. It cannot be said on the
ordinary standard of proof either that C has suffered a tortious injury, or
that D has caused one. Imposing liability neither puts C in the position we
believe she or he would have been in had D acted with reasonable care, nor
holds D responsible for an injury we believe she or he has caused (even if it
cannot be pinned down to a particular victim). It seems undesirable to allow C, having failed to establish causation on an orthodox basis, to “have a
second bite at the cherry” in the hope of succeeding, even if only in part, on
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35. Cf. Gregg v. Scott [2005] UKHL 2 [224], [2005] 2 AC 176 (Baroness Hale): “[i]t would be a
‘heads you lose everything, tails I win something’ situation.”
36. As it appears to have been assumed was the situation in Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Ltd.
[2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 (appeal taken from Eng.).
37. France: Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Oct. 24, 1962 (unpublished),
RTD civ., 1963, 334 (Fr.); Cour de cssation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ, Dec. 14,
1965, Bull. civ. I, No. 541 (Fr.); Florence G’Sell-Macrez, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in
France: Part I: The French Rules of Medical Liability Since the Patients’ Rights Law of March 4, 2002,
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1093, 1114–15 (2011). For Japan, see Robert B Leflar, The Law of Medical
Misadventure in Japan, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 79, 95 (2012). For the United States, see the summary
provided in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828–29 (Mass. 2008) (discussing that 20 states
and D.C. have accepted and 10 states have rejected the approach). English law, by contrast, has so far
rejected liability for loss of chance in connection with physical injuries, e.g., in the context of medical
negligence. Hotson v. E. Berkshire Area Health Auth. [1987] AC 750 (HL); Gregg v. Scott [2005]
UKHL 2 [2005] 2 AC 176 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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some alternative basis. That would be a case of “heads I win, tails you
lose” (at least partly). 35
Yet, a number of factors may lead us to question the justice of applying the orthodox rules of proof in such cases: (a) large and arbitrary differences in outcome can result from small differences in probability
(especially at the borderline between cases just under and just above the
ordinary threshold, e.g., under a preponderance of the evidence rule, cases
of 49% and 51% probability); (b) under-deterrence results where the defendant’s activity only adds to an independent background risk, and does
not exceed it; (c) the lack of sanction for breach of duty in such a case (the
“empty duty” argument); and (d) alternatively, the over-deterrence that
results if the defendant’s activity habitually more than doubles the background risk.
These considerations may lead us to think again whether it is appropriate to stick with the orthodox all-or-nothing approach in all cases when
its outcome in practice is no liability at all. In fact, several legal systems
already admit exceptions to the orthodox rule in particular circumstances—
for example, where a hospital patient’s condition is misdiagnosed and she
or he receives the wrong treatment, thereby losing the chance of recovery
provided by the correct treatment, or where a worker develops mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos tortiously in the workplace and nontortiously in the general environment. 36 These exceptions testify to a strong
feeling across different legal traditions that the orthodox approach to proof
of causation can produce injustice, as demonstrated by the developments
discussed below.
An oft-used juridical technique in such cases is the award of damages
for loss of chance (especially in medical cases). Damages for loss of chance
are accepted, for example, in France, Japan, and a majority of U.S. states.37
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The patient recovers damages for being deprived of the chance of recovering from the condition for which treatment was required—or at least of
achieving an outcome better than that which eventuated—and the damages
are proportionate to the chance lost.
A comparable outcome is achieved in other legal systems by deeming
the defendant to have contributed to the harm to the extent of his or her
contribution to the risk of the harm’s occurrence, as illustrated in the context of clinical negligence in Austria,38 and employers’ liability for occupational exposure to asbestos in England and the Netherlands. 39 Proportional
liability was also endorsed in the Principles of European Tort Law: 40
Alternative causes
(1) In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have
been sufficient to cause the damage, but it remains uncertain which one
in fact caused it, each activity is regarded as a cause to the extent corresponding to the likelihood that it may have caused the victim’s damage. 41
Uncertain causes within the victim’s sphere
The victim has to bear his loss to the extent corresponding to the likelihood that it may have been caused by an activity, occurrence or other
circumstance within his own sphere. 42

In some legal systems, by contrast, the mechanism adopted preserves
an all-or-nothing outcome—for example, where there is a reversal of the
burden of proof. 43 Yet, reversing the burden of proof merely shifts the inequities resulting from the all-or-nothing approach without actually reducing them. Further, in practice, it places the entire loss on the shoulders of a
defendant who has not been shown to have tortiously injured anyone, for
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 86 Side B
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38. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Nov. 7, 1995, 4 Ob 554/95,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Justiz&Dokumentnummer=JJT_19951107_OGH00
02_0040OB00554_9500000_000 (Austria) (child suffocated by coiling of umbilical cord in womb).
39. Compensation Act 2006, c. 29, § 3 (UK) (reversing the decision in Barker v. Corus [2006]
UKHL 20 in the specific context of mesothelioma); HR 31 maart 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU6092
(Nefalit/Karamus) (Neth.).
40. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW (2005),
http://www.egtl.org/Principles/index.htm.
41. Id. art. 3:103.
42. Id. art. 3:106.
43. This is the typical approach of German law in cases of clinical negligence, though it is subject
to somewhat restrictive conditions. Marc Stauch, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Germany,
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1139, 1154–56 (2011); Marc Stauch, The 2013 German Patients’ Rights Act—
Codifying Medical Malpractice Compensation, 6 J. EUR. TORT L. 85, 90–91 (2015). Also adopting an
all-or-nothing approach, the Compensation Act 2006, c. 29, § 3 (UK), applying to mesothelioma claims
only, produces the remarkable result that full liability may result where the defendant contributes only a
little to the overall risk to which the claimant was exposed. See, e.g., Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Ltd.
[2011] UKSC 10 [4], [2011] 2 AC 229 (appeal taken from Eng.) (ruling that the defendant employer
was liable for 100% of the claimant’s loss in circumstances where 85% of her total exposure to asbestos
was non-tortious environmental exposure and only 15% was attributable to the defendant’s tort).
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the benefit of a claimant who has not been shown to have been tortiously
injured. The reasons for allowing any exception at all to the orthodox approach are much weaker than those applying in the three scenarios discussed above, and it seems that the liability should, therefore, be less
stringent—or, at least, no more stringent. Proportional liability, in one form
or another, thus seems preferable to the simple reversal of the burden of
proof and to other mechanisms that preserve an all-or-nothing outcome—
assuming any departure from the orthodox rules is to be permitted at all.
CONCLUSION
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The short comparative survey undertaken in the previous paragraphs
demonstrates very clearly that the development of a range of juridical techniques to address perceived problems of uncertain causation has often proceeded in an ad hoc and unprincipled fashion, without regard for overall
coherence. This article has argued for a more principled legal approach in
which the appropriate legal response (full liability, proportional liability, or
no liability) is adopted on the basis of a ranking of the different categories
of cases in which problems of causal uncertainty can arise. This ranking
reflects the strength (or weakness) of the arguments in favor of the imposition of (at least some) liability even though the uncertainty in regards to
causation prevents the ordinary standard of proof from being satisfied.
The results of the ranking exercise to some extent go against prevailing orthodoxy—at least as judged by the most common juridical techniques
employed in various countries. According to the ranking adopted here, a
more stringent liability is justified in the “closed group” category of cases,
in which the market-share theory produces proportional liability, than in the
category of indeterminate defendants, exemplified by the hunters case,
where full liability on the basis of a reversed burden of proof is often applied. Conversely, where the potential causes include risks within the victim’s own “sphere,” the ranking suggests that the arguments in favor of an
exception to the ordinary approach to proof of causation are at their weakest, which highlights the anomaly of preserving the all-or-nothing outcome
for certain categories of such cases in some jurisdictions—for example,
through a reversal of the burden of proof.
The argument here is not that there is necessarily a single “correct”
outcome in any particular category of case, but merely that it should be
ensured, at a minimum, that the overall distribution of outcomes reflects the
hierarchical ranking of the reasons favoring liability in the various categories. Bearing this ranking in mind as the various juridical techniques are re-
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examined and refined should facilitate the more coherent development of
the law in this area in the future.
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